Applied Meaning in Law

The application of a provision to an object x – in that sense, in which we would say de Denning applied Article III to the bill of lading clause – is something we can do only with thought. This is an argument leading to a certain conclusion about x. Do I have the right to explain what it means for a person to apply a provision p to a particular object x by saying that p must be taken by that person to apply it to x? There is no circularity. Applying a provision to x is not the same as applying a provision to x. To say that Denning applied Article III(8) to the clause is to say something about what Denning did. To say that Article III,8 applies to this clause says a lot about how the provision relates to the clause: it means that the provision is (or was) applicable to it. But of course, we need to be clearer about this term. One way to think about this is to look at the structure of the argument that a judge like Denning would give to justify such a decision, to show argumentatively that the decision is legally justified by the law enforcement decision. I am not proposing a definition that a person who applies a provision pragmatically must also present an argument demonstrating that the act in question is legally justified. A court could simply act as described in the definition, and it would apply the law – even if it were impossible to say externally that the action was conducted as a continuation of law enforcement. But again, the courts often make arguments along these lines, and we can learn more about the pragmatic application of the law by reflecting on the structure of those arguments; The justification link between the applicable provision and the implemented measure is clear in the fully reconstructed conclusion. As citizens, according to some authors, we can treat the law in a variety of ways – we can obey, obey, break, claim, invoke, etc.

– but not quite by “applying” it. Footnote 10 This is only partially true, as we know today: because we often apply the law as ordinary citizens. Let`s say you want to get married, but after recently divorcing yourself, you`re wondering if you`re legally able to remarry so soon. So you read the relevant laws and you come to the conclusion that you are actually allowed to remarry. Applied inferentially, they applied the relevant provisions to reach that conclusion. Thus, if Denning publicly makes a written argument for his conclusion – if he justifies that conclusion to his readers – he has already applied the provision. What he writes documents his argument. This is proof of how he thought for us. But he would still have applied Article III to the relevant clause (whether we know or not) if he had not done so or had refused to make an argument for any reason. So, do the courts apply the law to or in – or when they decide – cases in any of these senses? Yes. In sense 1, the term is used to designate, albeit redundantly, the indirect object of the inferential application of the right: that to which the right is applied inferentially. In sense 4, it refers to the decision-making context in which the court is confronted with a normative question to which the claim of pragmatic application of the law provides an answer.

And in sense 2, it refers exactly to this question, the question in the decision whose court will apply the law pragmatically. This is what we see in The Hollandia. Denning was of course of the view that accepting the appeal was the act that the court should legally perform; and it took that view on the ground that there was a specific provision – Article III(8) of the Haag-Visby Rule – which was applicable with some consequence to the special clause of the bill of lading. It therefore accepted the Tribunal`s decision as legally justified by reference to that provision; He used this provision to substantiate the court`s request to grant the appeal – to subscriptively justify it, so to speak. First, a representative who pragmatically applies a provision p need not be the same person who applied it to the subject matter in question. As a general rule, of course, it will be the same judge or tribunal that applies a provision to an object x and draws the appropriate conclusion; and then apply that provision pragmatically by taking the action that supports that conclusion. But the two operations can fall on different entities. That seems to be the case, for example, where a national court of a Member State of the European Union refers a question of interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice of the Union.